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Abstrak: Al-Jam’iyatul Washliyah merupakan sebuah organisasi Islam moderat 
di Indonesia. Para ulama sejauh ini mendapatkan kedudukan terhormat dan 
strategis dalam organisasi ini. Para ulama sebagai kelompok elit dalam organisasi 
Al Washliyah memberikan respons terhadap persoalan sosial keagamaan di 
Indonesia, termasuk masalah radikalisme dan terorisme. Respons mereka 
terhadap masalah ini perlu diketahui dan menjadi salah satu landasan bagi 
upaya menangkal paham dan gerakan radikalisme dan terorisme di Indonesia. 
Artikel ini mengkaji respons para ulama Al Washliyah terhadap radikalisme 
dan terorisme. Kajian artikel ini difokuskan pada respons mereka terhadap 
empat isu yang menjadi doktrin kelompok-kelompok radikalis dan teroris 
yakni negara Islam, jihādī, takfīrī, dan bom bunuh diri. Artikel ini mengajukan 
temuan bahwa para ulama Al Washliyah yang menjadi informan terpilih 
memberikan interpretasi yang berbeda mengenai keempat isu tersebut. Studi 
ini menunjukkan bahwa ulama Al Washliyah mengedepankan moderasi dalam 
kehidupan beragama dan berbangsa, dan secara tegas mereka menolak paham 
dan gerakan radikalisme dan terorisme.
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Abstract: Al Washliyah is a moderate Islamic organization in Indonesia. 
Ulama (Islamic scholars) have obtained honorable and strategic positions in 
Al Washliyah organization. As an elite group in Al Washliyah organization, 
the ulama have responded to socio-religious problems in Indonesia, including 
issues of radicalism and terrorism. Their responses to these problems should 
be understood as the Ulama's reflection and a foundation in counteracting 
radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia. This paper is mainly written to get an 
insight into the ulama’s responses towards the four issues indoctrinated by 
the radical and terrorist groups such as the Islamic State, jihādī, takfīrī, and 
suicide bombers. This research highlights that Al Washliyah ulama give different 
interpretations of those four doctrines, by prioritizing moderation in religion 
and firmly rejecting radicalism and terrorism in actions or ideas.
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Introduction 
This study discusses Al-Jam’iyatul Washliyah (Al Washliyah) ulama’s 
(Islamic scholars) response to radicalism and terrorism issues in Indonesia, 
particularly those related to the Islamic state, jihād, attitudes towards 
non-Muslims and suicide bombings in Indonesia. Al Washliyah was 
established in Medan, November 30, 1930, by the students of Maktab 
Islamiyah Tapanuli (MIT) and Madrasah Al-Hasaniyah, which is 
affiliated with the Sunni sect (Shāfi‘ites and Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah) 
(Rasyidin, 2016). These organizations focus on education, preaching, 
social charity, and economic empowerment activities. Al Jam’iyatul 
Washliyah means “a connecting association”. It becomes evident that 
this organization upholds the vision of religious moderatism (Pengurus 
Besar Al Washliyah, 2015b). Al Washliyah has successfully contributed 
to preserving and strengthening moderate Islamic teachings in the 
Indonesian archipelago. 
There have been several studies on the response of Islamic 
organizations and scholars towards radicalism. Still, none discusses the 
response of Al Washliyah’s ulama to the issue. Abubakar & Hemay 
(2020) studied radicalism among teachers in pesantren (Islamic boarding 
schools). Some studies focus on the response of Islamic organizations 
such as Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah (Hilmy, 2013) and Al-
Ittihadiyah (Nasution & Rasyidin, 2019). Zada (2002), on the other 
hand, researched radical groups. 
Up to date, the attitude of Al Washliyah’s ulama toward radicalism 
remain understudied. This organization is one of the most prominent 
Islamic organizations in Indonesia, with millions of supporters spreading 
across provinces, especially Aceh, North Sumatra, Jakarta, West Java, 
Banten, and South Kalimantan. Thus, the organization plays a significant 
role in shaping Indonesian Muslim society. Al Washliyah also manages 
704 madrasas, schools and universities (Pengurus Besar Al Washliyah, 
2021b). As an Islamic organization with a large constituency, Al Washliyah 
also criticized various acts of terror in the name of Islam. President Joko 
Widodo, at the opening ceremony of the 22nd Al Washliyah Congress 
in Jakarta, 19 March 2021, said that Al Washliyah is an organization 
that “develops a culture of moderation in religious and national life”. 
Al Washliyah Fatwa Council stated that “terrorism is a crime against 
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humanity and civilization that poses a serious threat to the state, security, 
world peace and is detrimental to the welfare of the people. Terrorism is 
an organized crime and frightens many people” (Ja’far, 2020). Therefore, 
Al Washliyah supports religious moderatism and condemns radicalism 
and terrorism.
This study examines the responses of Al Washliyah ulama to the 
idea of Islamic state establishment, jihād, attitudes toward non-Muslims 
and suicide bombings in Indonesia. Jonathan Matusitz (2013) posits 
that these four themes are important to radical groups. This research 
relies on document studies and interviews with ulama affiliated with Al 
Washliyah organization. The informants consist of prominent ulama in 
the organization. They are lecturers in the religious field and well-known 
for having an in-depth understanding of radicalism. Moreover, they 
also hold important positions in the organizations, especially executive 
leaders and board members of Al Washliyah Fatwa Council. Located 
at the central level, this Fatwa Council acts as a shari’a board. The 
Council discusses various religious issues. This Council does not exist 
at the provincial and district levels. The collected data is analyzed using 
Miles and Huberman’s methods: data reduction, data presentation, and 
conclusions (Miles et al., 2014).
Al Washliyah Ulama on Islamic State 
The Al Washliyah ulama give diverse emphasis on the idea of 
establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. Some affirm that it is not 
important to establish an Islamic state because Indonesian Muslims 
struggle to apply shari’a peacefully and constitutionally. In their view, 
establishing an Islamic state is less important than making shari’a 
legislation in Indonesia. Hasbullah Hadi states that the struggle of 
Muslims is not the establishment of an Islamic state but the enactment 
of shari’a law constitutionally. When shari’a is enacted, Indonesia will 
automatically become an Islamic state (Hadi, 2018). Saiful Akhyar Lubis 
affirms that the idea of  radical groups and terrorists to establish an 
Islamic state is unacceptable and unimportant because what is essential 
is to disseminate the teachings of Islam and make it a worldview of 
Indonesian Muslim society (Lubis, 2018). Syahrin Harahap adds that 
the attempt to imitate the condition during the early period of Islam to 
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establish an Islamic state is not an unimportant effort, but there should 
be more emphasis on upholding its universal principles. The structure of 
government in the time of the Prophet and his companions need not be 
reincarnated in its original form, but only its principles. Therefore, it is 
not important to uphold distinguishable symbols. Instead, there should 
be more heeds on disseminating Islamic principles to inspire the lives of 
the people and the state. In brief, they deem it unnecessary to establish 
an Islamic state (S. Harahap, 2010). What they think as imperative is 
how Islamic shari’a can be applied in Indonesia legally and how Islamic 
teachings can inspire the lives of the people and the state.
However, some ulama still consider establishing an Islamic state 
constitutionally instead of by force. This can be seen from M. Nizar Syarif ’s 
opinion, expressing the urgency for establishing an Islamic state, although 
it is impossible to change the system of the Indonesian government without 
a real movement. It is feasible to establish an Islamic state is in Indonesia 
through the legislative path. Thus, the cadres of Islamic organizations 
are obliged to become members of the legislature in order to change the 
legislation to conform with Islamic teachings. In his belief, it is important 
to consider that the Indonesian people are bound by Pancasila. It needs to 
be preserved because Pancasila is born out of the idea of  Muslims instead 
of unbelievers. The principles of Pancasila are the core of the teachings of 
Islam. Although they see the importance of establishing an Islamic state, 
some ulama consider that Pancasila is a final form. Indonesian Muslims are 
only to fight for the application of shari’a to be a legal rule in Indonesia 
to make Pancasila imbued with Islamic teachings (Syarif, 2016).
In addition, all Al Washliyah ulama disallow the use of the radical 
approach in the struggle for the implementation of shari’a in Indonesia; 
instead, they prefer to do it constitutionally. Hadi explained that the 
enforcement of shari’a law in Indonesia should be done constitutionally 
through the legislature, although secular groups will challenge it. Thus, 
some Al Washliyah ulama who actively served as executive officers of 
Al Washliyah assert that it is unnecessary to establish an Islamic state, 
although others opine otherwise. However, all are in one voice that the 
shari’a of Islam should be the law of the state, and the principles of Islam 
should enliven the state’s life. Furthermore, they are of the same opinion 
that it is prohibited to use radical means and terror in the struggle for 
Islamic law, except through the constitution (Hadi, 2018).
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Al Washliyah ulama serving as the Al Washliyah Fatwa Council 
board also have different views about the Islamic state. Some of them 
refuse to establish a formal Islamic state. Ramli Abdul Wahid rejects the 
idea and movement to change the system of the Indonesian government. 
In his view, the Republic of Indonesia’s government system and state’s 
principles of Pancasila should remain the same. However, Muslims must 
fill Pancasila and Indonesian’s rules with the teachings of Islam. Islam 
must imbue Pancasila, and it is crucial to apply the shari’a in Indonesia. 
Therefore, Muslims must first be enlightened so that they are ready to 
accept shari’a. Indonesian Muslims are bounded by a platform called 
Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and the House of Representatives, for 
which they must be in accordance with the teachings of Islam. Muslim 
leaders in Indonesia should try to fill them with the teachings of Islam, 
and fight for Islam in the House of Representatives (Wahid, 2018).
Ovied Rangkuti denies the so-called Islamic state but reinforces the 
importance of establishing a state with Islamic principles. He believes that a 
country can be considered an Islamic state if its law is not contradictory 
to Islamic law, even though its form does not conform to an Islamic 
state. Further, he explains that Muslims are obliged to guard the law 
of that country. Otherwise, if Muslims reject it, they are categorized as 
rebels. In fact, there is no ijmā’ ‘among ulama about the state form in 
Islam (Rangkuti, 2016). 
Other ulama well support such opinion. Amar Adly asserted that 
it is inappropriate to raise the idea of  establishing an Islamic state, 
but Muslims should prioritize thinking about the realization and 
implementation of Islamic teachings in Muslim societies in the first 
place. When Muslims uphold and practice the teachings of Islam in 
their daily life, Indonesia will inevitably turn into an Islamic state. It 
is quite ironic that the Islamic state is upheld, but the teachings of 
Islam are not practiced consistently by Muslims (Adly, 2018). Watni 
Marpaung affirms that there is no need to discuss the Islamic state 
from the formalistic aspects of Indonesia since there are many Islamic 
countries founded formally with no Islamic principles in it. Muslims 
thus should be more focused on making Islamic regulations. Raising 
the symbols of the Islamic state in Indonesia can only lead to disputes 
among other religious people. In fact, it is possible to label Indonesia 
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as an Islamic country because the majority of the population embraces 
Islam, although formally, it does not take an Islamic state (Marpaung, 
2018). The same thing is expressed by M. Riduan Harahap, in that he 
believes that the idea of  establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia is no 
longer important. What is more essential today is to incorporate Islamic 
values  into the Indonesian state system. Thus, Indonesia will be a country 
adhering to Islamic principles. To put it in brief, it can be highlighted 
that Al Washliyah’s teachers reject the idea of  the formal Islamic state 
and call for the revitalization of Islamic values  in the life of the family, 
community and state of Indonesia (M. R. Harahap, 2018).
Some ulama, who are Al Washliyah’s Fatwa Council members, are 
of the view for establishing an Islamic state. However, they believe that 
the effort must be pursued by the constitution instead of by radical acts. 
According to Ardiansyah, for now, it is irrelevant to bring up the idea 
for the establishment of an Islamic state. Indonesian ulama and Islamic 
organizations are of the same opinions that Indonesia is a unitary state, 
but that does not mean that the idea for establishing the Islamic state 
should cease. Islamic state may be established by considering Indonesian 
territorial and specific time frame, say when Indonesia is separated into 
several parts, which makes Pancasila no longer applied. However, the 
Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is the ultimate form, as is 
supported by Islamic mass organizations. Hence, when other parties 
try to raise a different ideology, Indonesian Muslims should oppose 
this, as do the scholars affiliated with Islamic mass organizations. All 
the while, the chances of establishing an Islamic state in the future 
remain widely open. Theoretically, it is imperative to enforce the state 
and government of Islam based on the Qur’an and hadith (Ardiansyah, 
2018). Irwansyah reinforces that the idea of  establishing an Islamic 
state needs to be supported by all Muslims because it is the only ideal 
prerequisite for the glory of Islam. It is undeniably true that the ultimate 
law for human beings is Islamic law, unlike democracy, which is not 
originally from Islam and is unfamiliar to Islam. The only concept ever 
written in Islam is discussion (shūrā). On this basis, it is no wonder if 
they believe that the Islamic state is still mandatory, despite the current 
condition in Indonesia, which disallows such effort since the Indonesian 
Republic is the ultimate form of the country resulting from previous 
scholars' convention. All in all, it is possible to stay that they shared 
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the similar thought that democracy is not derived from the teachings 
of Islam (Irwansyah, 2018).
Thus, the thoughts of the ulama from Al Washliyah about the 
Islamic state are divided into two. The first opinion comes from the 
ulama who reject the concept of the Islamic state. However, they 
still consider the importance to implement Islamic law in Indonesia 
peacefully and constitutionally. This opinion rejects the notions and 
movements of radical groups, such as HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 
NII (Negara Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic State), JI (Jemaah 
Islamiyah), LJ (Laskar Jihad), MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia or 
Indonesian Mujahidin Council), and ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria) (Greg Fealy, 2004; Hilmy, 2014). Although they reject the notion 
of Islamic state, they are different from JIL (Jaringan Islam Liberal or 
Liberal Islam Network) because they still want to implement Islamic 
Law in Indonesia (Azmy & Yusra, 2020). The second opinion comes 
from the ulama accepting and admitting that Indonesia can become an 
Islamic State, but it must still be formed peacefully and constitutionally. 
However, this opinion is only a discourse. In reality, they still recognize 
the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, which are considered relevant 
to Islamic teachings and the legacy of the ulama in Indonesia. This group 
rejects violence and still accepts democracy. This makes them different 
from the mentioned radical groups that use violence to fight for an 
Islamic state and even rejects democracy. Because they reject violence, 
ulama from Al Washliyah are not categorized as radical. From Hilmy’s 
view, the ulama from Al Washliyah are part of a middle-moderation 
group that consists of educated scholars and becomes the leading agents 
in religious moderatism. Specifically, the second group can be called a 
radical-moderate group because they still prioritize the peaceful way 
(Hilmy, 2012) but still accept the notion of Islamic State. This second 
group is still influenced by classical fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) on 
constitutional law.
Al Washliyah Ulama on Jihād
The research’s questions were mainly aimed at targeting the responses 
of Al Washliyah ulama towards the meaning of jihād, the difference 
between jihād and terrorism, jihād against the infidels, and the division 
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of jihād. First, they agree that jihād is not limited to war but has a 
more humanistic meaning. Akhyar Lubis states that jihād is every effort 
carried out seriously, wholeheartedly, and totally with whatever they 
have to gain the pleasure of Allah SWT. Hadi argues that some of the 
meanings of jihād include the attempt to uphold, establish, and fight 
for the establishment of Islamic law in all Muslim lifelines. According 
to Syarif, the meaning of jihād is to earnestly promote goodness, da’wah 
(proselytizing), and worship. According to Adly, the literal meaning of 
jihād is war, but it can also be interpreted with other meanings, such as 
the war of thought and words. Jihād in the sense of war is permissible 
as long as the elements of the permissibility of jihād are fulfilled. These 
elements are an Islamic state, permission from the Imam, and being 
attacked by the infidels. Also, it is imperative that during the war, 
Muslims are prohibited from making destruction, say destroying houses 
of worship, killing children and women, cutting down trees, and killing 
animals unlawfully.
Some other ulama also provide other meanings of jihād. According 
to Hadi, the most relevant meaning of jihād for Muslims today is jihād 
in the sense of trying to uphold and struggle to disseminate the teachings 
of shari’a into the rules of life on earth so as to improve the welfare 
of Muslims in all walks of life in accordance with Islamic teachings, 
especially in terms of the economy, social, politics, and education. 
Ovied opined that the true notion of jihād is not limited to fighting 
in the path of God, but it is broader than that. Jihād is anything that 
can elevate Islamic religion, such as jihād in the field of organization, 
politics, education, economy, culture, social activities, and technology. 
According to Akhyar Lubis, Muslims can do jihād with anything they 
own, including knowledge, wealth, position, and power to benefit other 
Muslims. Irwansyah added that the true essence of jihād for Muslims 
is eradicating poverty, ignorance, underdevelopment, and increasing the 
low level of Muslim’s human resources. It is undeniably true that learning 
is also jihād.
Syahrin Harahap asserts that Muslims interpret jihād into two 
connotations. (1) The first interpretation refers to that shared by 
Muslim fighters, especially those living in the conflict area, requiring 
them to maintain Islam politically and demographically. No wonder 
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that in their view, the word jihād is understood more by its generic 
meaning in accordance to the history of the word referring to holy 
war in the struggle for Islam. (2) The second interpretation defines 
jihād as a struggle for progress and empowerment with Islamic spirit. 
In addition to the connotations of war, the word jihād in Islam has 
four more important connotations. First is jihād in the meaning of 
empowerment. The essential substance of the meaning of jihād is the 
struggle to genuinely exert all the potential and ability to defend the 
religion of God to achieve Allah’s approval. Second, jihād is defined 
as an effort to improve work ethic and quality of work. Third is jihād 
in the meaning of diplomacy. Fourth, jihād in meaning is critical in 
upholding the truth (S. Harahap, 2010).
Second, they also affirm the distinction between jihād and terrorism. 
Wahid asserted that there is a stark difference between jihād and 
terrorism. He insists that terrorism is destructive and anarchic, aiming 
at instilling fear and is carried out without boundless rules and targets. 
On the contrary, jihād means to repair, even through warfare, to uphold 
Islam and defend the rights of the oppressed. This is supposed to be 
done following the rules set by the shari’a with clear targets. According 
to Syarif, jihād and terrorism are not identical. If terrorism is valued 
as part of jihād as what ISIS shares, the hatred against Islam and its 
adherents shared by those non-Muslims will take to its toll. Terrorists 
make such interpretation falsely to distract Muslims from the real 
meaning of jihād. M. Nasir added that there is an absolute difference 
between terrorism and jihād. According to him, terrorism uses violence, 
cruelty and brutality to cause fear in humans to achieve unregulated 
goals, while jihād is a noble task to defend religion. Terrorism is usually 
used for political and power purposes. In contrast, jihād aims to guide 
human beings in achieving happiness based on affection, merely hoping 
for God’s pleasure. Terrorism is entirely unjust and astray from the 
guidance of Islam, while jihād is an effort to maintain religion’s integrity. 
Ovied opines that terrorism and jihād are dissimilar in the way that 
terrorism is purely a criminal act. Meanwhile, jihād is a struggle based 
on religious norms in accordance with shari’a. According to Hadi, the 
notion of deeming jihād as terrorism is unacceptable. This is constructed 
by the West. In the Islamic essence, the meaning of jihād is vast. Hence, 
it is entirely erroneous to consider jihād as terrorism or a mere war. 
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Although one of the meanings of jihād is indeed a war, not every war 
may be labeled as jihād unless it is done according to shari’a guidance.
There are diverse opinions among Al Washliyah’s ulama about 
the doctrine of jihād against the infidels. Wahid asserted that radicals 
misinterpreted the verses of jihād since war and murder are never 
tolerable in Islam. Murder and wars against other people or other nations 
are only permissible for defending life and religion. Islam also regulates 
the ethics of war as it should not kill women and children or damage 
and tear down enemy buildings for unjustifiable reasons. Akhyar Lubis 
believes the meaning of jihād against the infidels, as written in the 
scripture, is more on the fight against human destruction, regardless 
of religion. Kāfirs are not merely seen from whether they are Muslims 
or not because the essential meaning of kāfir is disbelieving. Every 
religious believer possesses the likelihood of being a disbeliever, with no 
exception a Muslim. Thus, the war against the heathen is a war against 
the prevailing disbelief lying inside the heart of every religious person.
Jihād, in this sense, is in line with the jihād against the passions. 
According to Syarif, Muslims are only allowed to carry out jihād against 
unbelievers as long as Muslims are attacked and assaulted by infidels. At 
the same time, Muslims are banned from fighting the unbelievers who 
befriend the Muslim community. Ardiansyah maintains that the verses 
and hadith of jihād and war can never simply be applied in various 
situations and conditions since they must be correctly understood 
according to the scholars' commentaries. Indonesia, for instance, is 
declared by a particular group as dār al-ḥarb, where jihād is a necessity. 
This opposes the scholars’ opinion, considering Indonesia is a dār al-
salām. Thus, war and the massacre of innocent people are unnecessary.
Those ulama also divided jihād into some sections. M. Riduan 
Harahap shared the same thought in that jihād in Islam consists of three 
levels, namely jihād against self, jihād against demons, and jihād against 
the enemy (jihād against falsehood, immorality, cruelty, and arbitrary 
acts, jihād against the polytheists, and Disbelievers). The most important 
type of jihād in Indonesia is jihād against lust and jihād against the 
temptations of Satan.
From the explanation above, it can be seen that the ulama of Al 
Washliyah refuse the notion of Jihad as a “holy war” to crush the infidels 
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as what is thought by radical fundamentalist groups (Bachtiar et al., 
2019). The ulama of Al Washliyah also found errors from interpretation 
made by radical groups in interpreting verses related to jihād, which is 
one of several factors driving the emergence of radicalism and terrorism 
(Zuhdi, 2019). Studies have shown that radicals and terrorists have 
distorted the meaning of jihād (Marranci, 2006). Al Washliyah’s ulama 
views on jihād have been inspired by the classical ulama in the field of 
fiqh (Aydin, 2012), especially the Shāfi’iyah school. Their views on jihād 
show that they accept moderation and reject radicalism.
Al Washliyah Ulama on Non-Muslims
Al Washliyah ulama’s response to non-Muslim existence can be 
seen from views of the urgency of fostering religious harmony; the 
ability to work with non-Muslims in mu'āmalah; attitudes toward non-
Muslims who are hostile towards Muslims; attitudes toward countries 
that interfere with the interests of Islam; and attitude towards the 
concept of kāfir ḥarbī. First, all Al Washliyah ulama agree that Muslims 
should foster harmony with non-Muslims and foster cooperation in 
all fields except ‘aqīdah and shari‘a, and so long as they do not attack 
the Muslim community. Masyhuril Khamis states that the dā’ī, ulama 
and religious leaders should soothe the community with their preaches. 
The role of religious leaders is significant in providing the community 
with an insight to maintain a harmonious atmosphere. Religious 
tolerance and peace among people are fixed priced and non-negotiable 
(Pengurus Besar Al Washliyah, 2015a). Later, Syahrin Harahap added 
that Islam came to bring mercy to the whole universe. Affection is not 
only for lovers, families and relatives, but love is given to all beings. 
The offer of affection in Islam is meant for the within groups and 
communities (S. Harahap, 2010). According to Syarif, Muslims are 
allowed to cooperate with non-Muslims in the social field. At the 
same time, they are forbidden from cooperating with non-Muslims 
in faith and worship as promoted by religious pluralism supporters. 
Hadi added that Muslim attitudes toward unbelievers must be seen in 
different contexts. Riduan Harahap reveals that Indonesian Muslims 
must uphold mutual respect for non-Muslims. Therefore, Muslims 
should display the Islām of raḥmatan li al-‘ālamīn.
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According to Wahid, Islam recognizes the existence of other religions 
and their adherents. The term Islam itself refers to salvation, and it is a 
symbol of peace declaration with all people regardless of religion. This is 
in line with the core principle of why Islam was brought by the Prophet 
Muhammad, that is as raḥmatan li al-‘ālamīn. According to Ovied, the 
Qur’an and Hadith had explained how the believers should treat people 
of different religions in which they should respect them as well as possible 
and behave fairly towards them. 
Secondly, some ulama suggest that Muslims may cooperate with 
non-Muslims in terms of mu’āmalah. According to Wahid, Muslims 
may be friends with them, as long as they are not hostile to Muslims. 
Islam commands that Muslims take heed of poor non-Muslims or help 
each other and unite in facing common enemies. Muslims should live 
peacefully side by side with other people, not just other people in their 
own country, but also with people from other nations. Ardiansyah 
reveals that Muslims are allowed to establish cooperation in the field 
of mu’āmalah as long as non-Muslims do not betray the covenant with 
Muslims. However, the tolerance of Muslims does not apply in the 
field of ‘aqīdah and shari‘a, for example, worshiping together and eating 
non-Muslim food. Adly insists that Muslims are allowed to cooperate 
with non-Muslims socially, at the individual and state level, as long 
as it does not cause any harm to Muslims. Still, Muslims are ought 
to keep cautious in cooperating with non-Muslims. Once there is an 
indication that such cooperation is harmful to Muslims, the cooperation 
is unjustified. Riduan Harahap added that Muslims’ friendly attitude 
toward non-Muslims should not undermine the sanctity of ‘aqīdah and 
worship and degrade the dignity of Islam and Muslims. The attitude of 
Muslims must remain firm in matters of faith and worship since there 
is no bargain for these things. 
Thirdly, some Al Washliyah ulama claimed that Islam values that  it 
is important to respect other believers. However, if non-Muslims exhibit 
a hostile attitude towards religion and Muslims, Muslims must stand to 
fight. According to Hadi, every Muslim can interact and cooperate with 
unbelievers. However, when the disbelievers disrupt Islam and Muslims, 
it is obliged for Muslims to fight against them as demanded by Islamic 
law. Ovied uttered that Muslims must be firm against individuals and 
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non-Muslim countries that are hostile to Muslims. Muslims must be firm 
against The United States, which is a state supporting the existence of 
Israel that does not give the rights of the Palestinian people. The state 
of Israel will forever become the enemy of Muslims as long as they do 
not surrender the Palestinian people's rights and sovereignty.
Fourth, some Al Washliyah ulama affirm the urgency of boycotting 
the products of countries that express hostility towards the state and 
Muslims. Ovied affirms that Muslims need to boycott The United State 
and Israeli products individually while boycotting their products by the 
Indonesian state is unnecessary because it will only cause new problems 
in the global political aspect. According to Hadi, Muslims must fight 
against the domination of The United States and its allies by gathering 
the strength of Muslims in the field of education, economics, politics, 
and technology. Irwansyah reinforces that it is a must to fight against 
countries that oppress Muslims by boycotting their products, such as 
Israel and The United States, two countries considered to harm Islam 
a great deal. 
Fifth, some Al Washliyah ulama reveal the concept of kāfir harbī 
and the attitude of Muslims against them. According to Adly, given 
to the current fact that the so-called Islamic state (daulah islāmiyah) 
does not exist, there is no such thing as kāfir harbī, that is, infidels to 
be fought. Thus, Muslims should enlighten non-Muslims and pagan 
countries to convert them instead of fighting against them. Ardiansyah 
added that there had been clear guidance as to how Muslims should treat 
non-Muslims in that Muslims are obliged to guard the blood of others, 
except those who disbelieve and attack the Muslims. In the concept of 
warfare in Islam, Muslims are strictly forbidden to kill non-Muslims 
who do not fight, especially children, women, the elderly, and people in 
the worship houses. Indeed, not all unbelievers are enemies of Islam, for 
there are kāfir dhimmī and kāfir harbī. Since Indonesia is not an Islamic 
state and has no religious leader, the jihād command in Islam cannot be 
a strong reason for waging warfare and attacks on other religions. Jihād 
is only applicable when the elements of jihād, such as the Islamic state 
and Islamic leadership, are fulfilled.
In general, the ulama's opinion in Al Washliyah about fostering 
relations with non-Muslims is influenced by ulama in fiqh, especially the 
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Shāfi’iyah School. Generally, they put forward the idea of Islam raḥmatan 
li al-‘ālamīn. However, the issue of relations between Islam and non-
Muslims still raises controversy and is seen as a sensitive issue (Podungge, 
2018). Ulama of Al Washliyah, as explained in the classic fiqh books, 
limit the relationship between the two parties by asserting that Muslims 
can build a relationship with non-Muslims in mu‘āmalah, not in faith 
and worship. That is why, for example, Al Washliyah rejects non-Muslim 
leaders (Ja’far, 2017). According to some people, the interpretation of Al 
Washliyah’s ulama on Muslim and non-Muslim relations, especially on the 
issue of non-Muslim leader, from the perspective of multiculturalism and 
democracy, seems rigid and intolerant and is considered to have failed in 
responding to contemporary socio-political dynamics since the rules in 
Indonesia do not prohibit them from becoming leaders (Syarif, 2012).
Al Washliyah Ulama on Suicide Bombing
Experts of radicalism and terrorism concur that the most important 
doctrine of terrorist groups is suicide bombing to achieve martyrdom and 
heaven. In this case, Al Washliyah ulama agree that suicide bombing in 
the name of religion conducted in the dār al-salām area and destroying 
Western symbols is an unjustifiable act in Islam. However, they differed 
on suicide bombings in the dār al-ḥarb region. 
Al Washliyah’s top officials rejected and condemned suicide bombings 
in Indonesia. M. Ridwan Ibrahim Lubis asserted that the suicide bombing 
done by terrorists in Indonesia is heretical and illegitimate. The suicide 
bomber is not a martyr (Dewan Fatwa Al Washliyah, 2009). Masyhuril 
Khamis added that if the country is safe, the suicide bombing is not 
jihād. Instead, it is a disgraceful act. Islamic teachings forbade his people 
to commit actions that damage lives, let alone kill innocent people. So, 
such understanding of the meaning of jihād should be re-straightened 
(Pengurus Besar Al Washliyah, 2009, 2021a). 
Al Washliyah’s ulama, who once served as the organization’s leader 
in North Sumatra and made it as a base of his work, also rejected 
the doctrine of suicide bombing as a martyr’s act for the requirement 
of heaven. According to Syarif, suicide bombing is not part of jihād; 
instead, it is a sinful suicide, and the perpetrators are subjected to severe 
torture in the hereafter. Akhyar Lubis asserted that suicide bombing is 
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a sin, self-torture, vain action, not part of jihād, and did not achieve 
martyrs. Death and life should not be in the hand of humans since it 
is God’s business. Thus, what needs to highlight is that Islam urges to 
prosper Muslims instead of torturing its adherents through self-blowing. 
Moreover, the victims who died from suicide bombing are not from the 
enemies of Islam but also innocent Muslims. Syahrin Harahap stated 
that Islam does not allow its people to detonate bombs to kill other 
humans. In Islam, killing a human would mean killing people as a whole. 
Suicide bombing does not indicate the perpetrators are implementing the 
teachings of Islam, but a form of a rigid and simplistic understanding of 
Islam, which betrayed the values  of love taught by Islam (S. Harahap, 
2010). Hadi conveyed the same thing that suicide is forbidden in Islam, 
as it is forbidden to commit suicide as a way of killing others. Suicide 
bombings are never justified in the teachings of Islam, let alone when 
it brings harm to many suicide bomb victims from among Muslims 
and innocent people, instead of the main target of the perpetrators. 
The suicide bombing is not part of jihād, and the culprit's death is not 
a martyr’s death. 
The group of ulama who served as the board of the Fatwa Council 
also strengthened the ban on suicide and suicide bombings. However, 
some of them justify suicide bombings as long as they fulfilled elements 
of jihād as described in the leading books of fiqh. There is no other way 
to destroy the Enemy fortress on the battlefield. However, some ulama 
are consistent that suicide bombing is forbidden. Imam Yazid, Secretary 
of the Al Washliyah Fatwa Council (2021-2026), emphasized that the 
law on suicide bombing is ḥaram (Yazid, 2021). 
Some agree that it is unlawful to detonate suicide bombing in dār 
al-salām, but it is allowed to conduct suicide bombing on the battlefield 
(dār al-ḥarb) as long as the elements of jihād are fulfilled. In Wahid’s view, 
it is unjustified to commit suicide bombing for personal gain. From the 
Islamic legal perspective, suicide bombing is ḥarām (unlawful) because it 
is a form of despair and self-destructive action, both in peace and war 
zones. The Indonesian suicide bombing targeting Western symbols such 
as the J.W. Marriot Hotel is unlawful because its enemy is unclear and 
the country is not in a state of war. Accordingly, the suicide bombers in 
Indonesia are not martyrs. They misunderstand their martyrdom. In this 
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fashion, it is essential to sensibly consider the benefit, harm, effectiveness, 
and contribution of suicide bombing for the struggle of Muslims and 
its impact on Muslims globally before choosing it as a way of fight. 
According to Ardiansyah, it is unjustifiable to do suicide bombing in 
Indonesia because it is not a war zone. The blood of the perpetrators is 
in vain because they killed themselves, which is a forbidden act. As a 
result, there is no obligation to bathe, shroud, and pray for the bodies of 
the suicide bombers. Their bodies should be buried like a carcass because 
they had gone against the command of Allah. The suicide bombers’ 
understanding is very mistaken as they misinterpreted the Qur’anic 
verses about jihād and qitāl (killing). They are not martyrs. According 
to Adly, suicide bombers in Indonesia cannot be labeled as jihād, because 
they do not meet the requirements of jihād. Their death in the suicide 
bombing is more to ridicule than a martyr since they endanger and 
end their lives for an unjustifiable reason. The current suicide bomb 
is not classified as ‘amaliyah al-ishtishād (martyrdom), but ‘amaliyah al-
intihāriyah (suicidal); in other words, it is not the practice of martyrdom. 
According to Wahid, a suicide bombing in the dār al-ḥarb area 
could be chosen as one of the ways to destroy enemy forces throughout 
the war legalized by the shari’a. However, it may be deemed a desperate 
attempt by a Muslim fighter to invade the enemy fortress. Thus, if it is 
the only way, there must be a reconsideration of the Islamic concept of 
war (ḥarb). On the battlefield, there are times when suicide is required; 
that is when a person is ready to die a martyr, for there are no other 
ways but that. Suicide bombings are allowed when the enemy and his 
target are clear, when they do not sacrifice the weak, and when they are 
done on the battlefield. The war must also be legalized by the mu’tamad 
‘ulamā’, such as the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), instead of 
individual scholars. In this fashion, suicide bombings are only allowed in 
Palestine. According to Adly, it is justified to conduct suicide bombings 
in Palestine because the elements of jihād are well fulfilled. In contrast, 
a similar practice should not be done in safe and sound countries like 
Indonesia. According to Ardiansyah, the notion of suicide bombing in 
a war that shari’a legalizes divides Islamic scholars into different views. 
Some scholars say that intihar (suicide) may be done under conditions 
of war against the enemies of Islam who attack Muslim regions. Watni 
added that suicide bombing is banned in dār al-salām regions, and is 
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only allowed in dār al-ḥarb area in urgent and critical conditions. If 
there is another way to destroy the enemies of Islam, it is expected 
that suicide bombs are not chosen as an option. Shari’a forbids suicide 
bombings for no reason, and those who carried out such acts are not 
categorized as jihād, and their death is not considered martyrdom. In 
Palestine, suicide bombings are possible when conditions are urgent, 
but in Indonesia, which is dār al-salām, there should be no reason for 
suicide bombings. 
Unlike the previous thoughts, some other ulama members of Al 
Washliyah Fatwa Council condemn the suicide bombing committed by 
the terrorists. Ovied states that suicide bombing aimed at the country 
and the symbol of the West is wrongdoing and indiscretion. Islam 
totally prohibits the act of violence and terror. The suicide bombers 
cannot be called shahīd/martyrs and do not go to heaven because 
they die in violation of the rules of shari’a of Allah. Irwansyah stated 
that the suicide bombers are not called martyrs, and it is necessary 
to review the Islamic view of the treatment of Muslims against the 
terrorist body. According to Riduan Harahap, suicide by any means 
is certainly not allowed in Islam, with no exception by exploding a 
bomb. Such terrorist acts negatively impact the image of Islam, and 
Muslims must affirm to the international world that Islam completely 
never teaches and strictly forbid suicide. 
All ulama in Al Washliyah agree that the law of suicide bombing 
is ḥarām, and it is not part of jihād. The perpetrators will not get 
martyred and can damage the image of Islam. Some of this opinion is 
influenced by the fiqh discussing dār al-salām and dār al-ḥarb. That is 
why some of them claim that Indonesia is dār al-salām in that the suicide 
bombings carried out by terrorist groups are illegal in Islam. However, 
according to them, in dār al-ḥarb areas such as Palestine, as long as 
the elements of jihād as described in the classical fiqh are fulfilled, the 
suicide bombings are possible, and even they must obtain the approval 
from the official ulama institution. Their views are identical to the Fatwa 
issued by the Indonesian Ulama Council. Thus, it can be seen that they 
reject the view of terrorist groups who legalize suicide bombings because 
Indonesia is dār al-ḥarb. Rusli explained that the Salafism Jihadist group 
in Indonesia justified suicide bombings targeting infidels and ṭāghūt 
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(false God) groups such as Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) and Jemaah 
Islamiyah (Rusli, 2014). This confirms that Al Washliyah ulama reject 
suicide bombings as those carried out by terrorist groups in Indonesia.
Conclusions
 In conclusion, Al Washliyah as an Islamic organization and Fatwa 
Council of Al Washliyah as its shari’a institution have responded to 
the problem of radicalism and terrorism. Both assert that Islam rejects 
radicalism and terrorism, and jihād is entirely dissimilar to both. 
In particular, Al Washliyah ulama have given various responses on 
radicalism and terrorism. First, some ulama still consider the importance 
of establishing an Islamic state, but such the idea must be pursued 
peacefully and constitutionally. On the other hand, some ulama cannot 
see the significance of establishing an Islamic state because the most 
important thing is to make the shari’a of Islam the only rule in Indonesia 
and to enliven Islamic values in the social life and nationwide. Secondly, 
all ulama of Al Washliyah think that the meaning of jihād is not limited 
to war as shared by terrorists, and jihād is different from terrorism. They 
agreed that Muslims should not kill non-Muslims who do not confront 
the religion and Muslims. In addition, they believe that jihād consists of 
three types: jihād against lust, jihād against demons, and jihād against the 
infidels threatening Islam. They believe that jihād against evil and demons 
is the greatest jihād, while jihād against the infidels confronting Islam 
is a small jihād. Third, Al Washliyah ulama agree that Muslims should 
foster interfaith harmony; Muslims may cooperate with non-Muslims 
in many fields, including the field of mu‘āmalah, but not in the field of 
‘aqīdah and sharī‘ah. They must also be firm against non-Muslims who 
challenge Islam. It is also necessary to boycott the products of countries 
that harm the Islamic world, and it is forbidden to kill the infidels who 
do not threaten Islam and Muslims. Fourth, some Al Washliyah ulama 
refuse suicide bombs, and even they consider that the perpetrators will 
not die as martyrs. On the other hand, some other ulama believe that 
suicide bombing is forbidden in dār al-salām, like Indonesia. In contrast, 
it may be done in dār al-ḥarb when the prerequisite for jihād conditions 
have been fulfilled, such as in Palestine.
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